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RODRIGO'S THIRTEENTH CHRONICLE:
LEGAL FORMALISM AND LAW'S
DISCONTENTS
Richard Delgado*
INTRODUCTION: IN WHICH THE PROFESSOR RETURNS TO THE
U.S. AND GETS CAUGHT UP ON WHAT Is Two
YOUNG FRIENDS HAVE BEEN DOING

"Professor! You're back!" Rodrigo leaped to his feet and
shook my hand fervently.' "I heard a rumor you might be coming.
What good news! Sit down. Did the authorities give you any

trouble?"
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D. 1974, Berkeley. -

Ed.

1. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE LJ. 1357 (1992) [hereinafter Rodrigo's FirstChronicle](introducing Rodrigo, the Professor's brilliant young friend and interlocutor). Rodrigo, the half brother of famed American civil rights lawyer and activist
Geneva Crenshaw, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: Tim ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987), was born in the United States but moved to Italy when his
father, an African American serviceman, was assigned to a U.S. outpost there. Rodrigo completed high school at the base school and attended an Italian university on government scholarships, graduating second in his law school class. In Rodrigo's First Chronicle,supra, the
Professor meets Rodrigo while he is on a return trip to the United States to investigate graduate law study. After discussing various LL.M. programs, they engage in a spirited discussion
of race, affirmative action, the decline of the West, and other topics.
Despite their age difference, they became good friends, discussing law and economics
(Rodrigo'sSecond Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183
(1993)); love (Rodrigo's Third Chronicle Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Tragedy of
Race, 81 CAL L. REV. 387 (1993) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Third Chronicle]);legal rules (Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in AntidiscriminationLaw, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1133 (1993) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle]); the critique of normativity (Rodrigo's
Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581
(1993)); relations between men and women (Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639 (1993) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle]); enlightenment political theory (Rodrigo'sSeventh Chronicle: Race,
Democracy, and the State; 41 UCLA L. REV. 721 (1994)); black crime (Rodrigo's Eighth
Chronicle: Black Crime; White Fears- On the Social Construction of Threa4 80 VA. L. REV.
503 (1994) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle]); racial discrimination and the rule of law
(Rodrigo'sNinth Chronicle: Race; Legal Instrumentalism, and the Rule of Law, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 379 (1994)); the role of merit (Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit andAffirmative Action,
83 GEo. L.J. 1711 (1995) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle]); clinical practice (Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL L. REV. 61 (1996) [hereinafter Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle]);and problems of desperately poor squatter settlements
(Rodrigo's Tvelfth Chronicle: The Problem of the Shanty, GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 1997))
over the course of the next two years. During this time, Rodrigo progressed from the status
of law student to professor at a public law school "in the Midwest." He and the Professor
continued their relationship, seeing each other at meetings, conferences, and airports.
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"Not at all," I replied, choosing one of the few uncluttered spots
on my young friend's couch. "I breezed right across. They didn't
even make me open my suitcase.2 I gather you didn't get my
letter."
"No, but Laz got a card and mentioned it to Giannina.3 So we
were hoping against hope that we'd hear from you."
"You'll probably get my letter next month. The mail is glacially
slow. It's one of the few things that takes a little getting used to
about my new home. I'm glad you're both in town."
"It's been a while," Rodrigo said. "How's the grandchild?"
"She and her mother are fine. They named her Gianna, after
your Giannina, I suspect."
"We hoped the lure of grandchildren would bring you back.
How long can you stay?"
"My visa's good for six months. But I'm thinking of heading
back the week after next. I'm helping my son-in-law lay tile for
their new patio, so that my daughter and the baby can go outside
when the weather's good." I looked at a pile of papers and reports
on Rodrigo's desk with yellow slips of paper sticking out. "What
are you working on?"
"Oh, that stuff," Rodrigo said, looking down. "I'm on the curriculum committee. Laz is the chair. The dean asked us to decide
what, if anything, the law school should do in response to these
reports. Are you familiar with this one, Professor?" Rodrigo
asked, holding up one of the volumes.
I half stood up and peered at the thick paperbound volume Rodrigo was holding up for my benefit. "That must be the MacCrate
Report. 4 It came out just as I was leaving. It caused quite a stir.
As I recall, it argued that legal education should be more practical.
2. See RicmARD DELoADO, THE COMING RACE VAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC
TALES OF AMERICA AFTER WELFARE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996), at the end of

which the Professor is deported. Like Rodrigo, the Professor is a fictional person and is not
to be identified with any individual, alive or not. A man of color in the late stages of his law
teaching career, the Professor is a composite of many persons I have known.
3. For an introduction to Laz, Rodrigo's colleague and best friend at the law school, see
Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle,supranote 1. A conservative who serves as the faculty advisor to
the local Federalist Society, Laz engages Rodrigo in spirited and freewheeling discussions
about faculty politics, race, and affirmative action. For an introduction to Giannina, Rodrigo's life companion and soulmate, see Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle,supra note 1. A published poet and playwright, Giannina is also adept at social and legal analysis. See, e.g.,
Rodrigo'sFourth Chronicle,supranote 1, at 1137; Rodrigo's Third Chronicle,supranote 1, at
402.
4. Drafted by a prestigious committee of lawyers, judges, and academicians, the MacCrate Report recommends a series of changes aimed at making legal education more practical by emphasizing the teaching of skills and values. See Legal Education and Professional
Development -

An EducationalContinuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEc. LEGAL EDUC AND ADMIS.
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A number of my friends applauded it. Others damned it because
they thought it threatened transformative scholarship and
teaching."
"And had you seen this other one?" Rodrigo asked.
I leaned forward again. "Oh, that's Judge Harry Edwards' arti5
cle. He sent me a reprint, which got forwarded to my new place.
Boy, has he changed. Did you know that we knew each other?"
"No, I didn't. But it stands to reason," Rodrigo replied.
"You're of the same generation. So you know he leveled quite a
blast at law review scholarship, charging that a high proportion of it
has little to do with law and judging."
"I don't know what got into him. He was quite a scholar before
he was on the bench. Maybe I'll write him sometime. But you
mentioned that there was something else?"
"Yes. The Carrington article. 6 We discussed it one time before.
It accuses CLS scholars - and, by implication, others, such as critical race theorists, feminists, and interdisciplinary writers - of nihilism and invites them to leave the academy."
"I remember. He said their message was counteraspirational
and went against the central ethos of the law. People who write in
that vein, he said, have no business teaching law students. They
should either move over to other departments or leave the academy
entirely.7 And so your dean asked you to look at all three?"
"She did. We're supposed to report on the implications they
bode for the way we teach and write. Her memo came with a sheaf
of news clippings about the public's discontent with law and
lawyers." 8
"Some of that was building when I left. The major newsmagazines have been covering it, even in their international editions,
which are the only ones we get down there. But it's not just the
public. Lawyers seem disenchanted with law practice as well.
Some are leaving. Others are thinking of doing so." 9
SitNS TO THE BAR (containing findings made by the A.B.A. Task Force on Law Schools and
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, chaired by Robert MacCrate).
5. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REv. 34 (1992).
6. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 222 (1984).

7. See id. at 227 ("If this risk is correctly appraised, the nihilist... has an ethical duty to
depart the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy.").
8. Rodrigo, Giannina, and the Professor discuss some of these matters in Part I. See infra
text accompanying notes 14-34.
9. See id. (discussing these and other laments of lawyers).
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"She asked us to look into all that. Can I offer you a cup of
coffee? Giannina will be here soon. Can you join us for dinner?"
"I'd love to," I said. "If it wouldn't be too much trouble."
"Not at all," Rodrigo replied. "Did I tell you that Giannina is in
law school now?"'1
"I had no idea! How does she like it? Where is she going? I
hope she hasn't given up her writing," I said.
"By no means. She says the first year is so weird she writes for
relief. She's finished half a book of poems and most of a play that
she refuses to let me see. I think it's about law school, and I'm
probably a character in it."
"Uh-oh," I said. "Reminds me of the time my daughter wrote a
crime mystery for a high school English class. It was so realistic the
teacher called home. My late wife and I had to do a lot of talking to
persuade the teacher we weren't running some sort of crime ring
out of our home!"
Rodrigo laughed. "She's going to the school across town. She
got high test scores and could have gone anywhere. But we've had
it with living apart."
"I'm glad you decided to stay together. I remember how hard
commuting was on the two of you that first year of teaching." But
tell me your thoughts on these three critiques. I assume you have a
theory."
"I do. Oh, the coffee's ready." Rodrigo busied himself for a
moment at his office espresso machine, then handed me a steaming
mug. "It's Italian blend. Your favorite, if I recall. And I have
cream and sugar right here."
"Just like the old days," I said.

10. Previously a successful (but impecunious) writer, Giannina had nevertheless exhibited an interest in law, even becoming an honorary member of the Women's Caucus at the
law school at which Rodrigo earned his LL.M. See Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle,supra note 1,
at 640-41. She also composed the lyrics for a counter-musical that spoofed a racist and sexist
one that had been sponsored by the students of Rodrigo's school; the counter-performance
was played by the LL.M. students, including Rodrigo. See Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle,supra
note 1, at 1136-37. Thus, the Professor is not entirely surprised to learn that the multi-talented young woman has decided to pursue a career in law.
11. See Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the Law Reviews, and the Attack on
Narrative Jurisprudence,68 S.CAL- L. REv. 545, 547 (1995) (final chronicle in first cycle
(chronicles 1-8) and concluding chapter of RicHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES
(1995)). Rodrigo graduated from his LL.M. program and took a law teaching position in the
Midwest. Giannina remained in the metropolis to pursue her own career, and the two commuted on weekends to be with each other.
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RODRIGO AND THE PROFESSOR REVIEW LAW'S

LAMENTS
As I mixed the condiments into my coffee, Rodrigo began:
"You asked if I had a theory, Professor. I do. As you know, the
two dominant currents in legal education today are, first, the
MacCrate-Edwards critique of legal education and scholarship as
not being practical enough, 12 and second, deep discontent with law
and lawyers, both on the part of the public and of lawyers themselves. My thesis is that these two are related, although not at all in
most people think. And the connecting
the way or in the direction
13
link is legal formalism."'
"Legal formalism?" I said. "You mean teaching and scholarship
that emphasize cases and doctrine over policy, critique, and interdisciplinary approaches? The Langdellian idea that law is a science
with only one right answer?"
Rodrigo nodded animatedly, whether in response to my answer
or to his own double-size mug of coffee, which he was rapidly draining, I could not tell. In any event, I went on: "So are you saying we
need more formalistic classroom teaching and more boring, doctrinal scholarship? I certainly hope that is not where you are going."
"Quite the contrary, Professor. Those things are precisely what
are causing all the trouble."
"That's a relief," I replied. "But I hope you can spell out the
connection, for you are definitely swimming against the tide. In
fact, you are saying the opposite of what the ABA report and my
old friend Harry Edwards are saying."
"I'll be happy to," Rodrigo replied. "But first consider what the
public is saying about lawyers, and also what lawyers are saying
about themselves and their profession."
"I'm all ears," I said. "I haven't practiced in quite a while, as
you know. But I've always done a little consulting, mostly in school
12. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
13. Associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell and the early Harvard school, legal
formalism holds that law is a science; that the principles of this science are to be found
through the study of case decisions; that these principles form a vast, comprehensive set; that
each legal problem has one right answer, and that the purpose of legal education is to instill
the principles of inductive and deductive science through a case-centered, Socratic dialogue.
For a succinct discussion of formalism and the transition to legal realism, see Elizabeth
Mensch, The History of MainstreamLegal Though4 in THE PoLrrlcs OF LAW (David Kairys
ed., 2d ed. 1990); see also infra note 81. Formalism went into decline with the advent of
realism in the 1920s, but it has been making a comeback. See Pierre Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 167, 180 (1990).
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desegregation cases. So I'm vitally interested in what you're going
to say."
A. In Which Rodrigo and the ProfessorAnalyze the Public's
Disenchantmentwith Law and Lawyers
"Let's take the public's attitudes first," Rodrigo began. "If
you'll just give me a minute." Rodrigo, who I knew from past experience was well versed in the new technology, 14 pushed a few buttons on his computer keyboard. "Where did I find that poll file?
Oh, here it is. Where were we?"
"Public attitudes toward lawyers."
"Right," Rodrigo said, looking down at his desk. "These clippings from the dean turned out to be only the tip of the iceberg. I
bet you've seen this one, at least."
I peered at what he was holding up for my benefit. "Yes, it's the
ABA president saying that the profession isn't as bad as it's made
out to be.' 15
"The public doesn't trust us. Many think we are ambulance
chasers who feast off the misfortunes of others. We are more interested in money than justice, prolonging suits in order to drive up
our fees. A Gallup Poll - if I can find it, oh, here it is - rated
lawyers below druggists, clergypersons, doctors, dentists, and college teachers for honesty and ethical standards. We ended up toward the bottom, not much above professional admen and used car
salespersons.' 6 In another survey of confidence in institutions, law
firms rated dead last, behind every branch of government, the military, major companies, Wall Street, the press, colleges and universities, the medical profession, and TV news. 17 Yet another poll found
that fifty-six percent of the public believed lawyers tend to recommend more legal work than necessary because it increases their
fees.' 8 Seventy-three percent said there are too many lawyers and
14. For example, see the computer-generated printouts contained as appendices to Rodrigo's First Chronicle, supra note 1, and Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1. The
Professor, who is much older than Rodrigo, envies his young prot6gd's electronic proficiency.
15. See Roberta Cooper Ramo, Let's Not Take It Anymore, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 6.
16. See John Dart, Public's Esteem of Clergy Slipping, Gallup Poll, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2,
1993, at Bll; see also Marilyn Kalfus, PublicPerception of Lawyers Declines in 71vo Opinion
Polls, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Dec. 12, 1988, at Al.
17. See Louis Harris, Changing Trends in American Politics,510 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY 663, 663 (1994) (discussing a Harris poll on confidence in institutions).
18. See Gordon Black, USA Today Poll, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1984.
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that the glut causes disputes to be taken to court when they
shouldn't be."19
"Sounds dismal," I said. "But, of course, you can prove almost
anything with statistics. The very way a polltaker frames a question
largely shapes the answer. 20 Maybe the public associates lawyers
with trouble - with divorces, drunk driving tickets, and other
hassles. Maybe it's a case of shooting the messenger."
"If so, they certainly think ill of the messenger," Rodrigo replied. "Another survey - this one by the ABA - showed that the
public views lawyers as being of uneven character and quality.2 1
And a second reflects the perception that lawyers are deficient in
compassion, caring, ethics, and honesty.2 We are motivated by
money and engaged in undignified advertising.2 3 Lawyer-bashing
jokes are legion." 24
I winced. "Even I've heard those from time to time. I'm a law
professor, but a certaip type of person makes it their business to let
me know at parties what they think of lawyers, as though I were
some sort of media-hungry, ambulance-chasing personal injury
shark."
"The same happens to me. I tell them I'm an Italian lawyer,
which I am. That usually shuts them up, because they have no idea
of whether or not their stock criticisms hold true elsewhere. Oh,
look here. Here's one on parents. Professor, would you want your
new grandchild to be a lawyer someday?"
"I'd be honored," I said.
"Most parents wouldn't. This poll," Rodrigo indicated his
screen, "shows that when parents were asked which of eight professions they would encourage their son or daughter to go into, only
five percent said law.25 Ten years ago, the figure was twelve. 26
Among the top six lawyers people today said they admire most, two
27
are fictional and two are dead."
19. See iL

20. See Brad Edmondson, How To Spot a Bogus Pol, AM. DEMOoRAPHICS, Oct. 1996, at
10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Amdem File.
21. See ABA CoMMN. ON PROFESSIONAUSM, "IN THE SpIrr OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONAUSM 3 (1986).

A

22. See Barbara Sheehan, Lawyers Urged to Address Criticismsof Profession, N.J. LAw.,
Dec. 26, 1994, at 9.

23. See id.
24. See Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NATL. L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1.
25. See id. at 20.
26. See id.
27. See id. (citing Randall Samborn, Who's Most Admired Lawyer?, NAT. L.J., Aug. 9,
1993, at 24).
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"I love fictional lawyers," I quipped. "Some of my best friends
Rodrigo rolled his eyes. "The dead lawyers are Thurgood Marshall and Abraham Lincoln. The fictional ones are Perry Mason
and Matlock.2 Miller Brewing Company aired a commercial featuring a "Big Lawyer Roundup," in which cowboys are shown las29
soing a hotshot divorce lawyer and an overweight tax attorney.
Oh, here's another poll of honesty and integrity. In this one we
'30
rank only slightly ahead of prostitutes and politicians.
31
"And used car salesmen, I think I read," I added.
"Them too, but barely. And finally," Rodrigo said while pressing more buttons on his computer and peering intently, "a recent
National Law Journal poll found that seventy-three percent of
Americans think there are too many lawyers.3 2 Thirty-one percent
considered lawyers less honest than most people.3 3 Three-fourths
said that the large amount of litigation is hindering the country's
economy."34
"A stunning indictment," I replied. "Especially when you hear
it all at once. We obviously have some work to do." I pointed toward the other folder that lay on Rodrigo's desk. "But I think you
mentioned another side to the story."
B. In Which Rodrigo and the Professor Discuss Lawyers'
Discontents
"More like another count to the indictment," Rodrigo continued. "Not only is the public fed up with law and lawyers, our colleagues are as well."
"Everyone pines for the good old days," I interjected. Then I
added: "Except for women and minorities of color. My law school
class boasted only four women and three students of color in addition to me. Even outstanding graduates like Sandra Day O'Connor
and my friend Santos Keller had trouble getting jobs. Surely, you
don't maintain that conditions for today's lawyers are worse?"
28. See Sambom, supra note 27, at 24.
29. See Samborn, supra note 24, at 22.
30. See Alan M. Slobodin, Pro Bono Should Be Free Choice,NATL. L.J., May 25, 1992, at
13.
31. See Dart, supra note 16, at B1l.
32. See Robert L. Haig, Lawyer-Bashing: Have We EarnedIt?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19,1993, at
2.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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"I'll let you decide," Rodrigo said, opening a second folder.
"Here's a study of lawyer satisfaction. An estimated 40,000 lawyers
a year are leaving the profession - almost as many as enter the law
schools. 3 5 A Maryland survey showed that more than onie-third
were unsure they would continue practicing law.3 6 Time cited a major increase in working hours and greater stress as contributing to
the erosion of the quality of life for attorneys.3 7 Firms today often
require that lawyers perform 2,000 to 2,500 hours of billable
38
work-"s
"Which, as we both know, means many more hours than that on
the job," I interjected.
"Of course. One can't bill for time spent eating, talking with
colleagues, or going to the washroom. That 2,500-hour figure, by
39
the way, is almost one-third greater than it was a decade ago.
'40
Many attorneys routinely put in twelve-hour days."
"It's gotten to the point that books are now warning students
about the hazards of law school," I added. "While browsing at a
bookstore in the airport, I noticed one entitled Full Disclosure: Do
You Really Want To Be a Lawyer?4 1 Another was entitled Running
from the Law: Why Good Lawyers Are Getting Out of the Legal
Profession.42 Both warned that law practice is becoming allconsuming, that lawyers have no family life, and that the practice of
law is repetitious and dull. Lawyers say that law is not as enjoyable
as it once was. 43 It leaves little time for reflection, contemplation,
or creativity.44 It's a business, not a learned profession. 4 5 I went
back for my fortieth-year law school class reunion. All my friends
were saying the same thing. Some were retiring or going into other
lines of work."
35. See Andrea Sachs, Have Law Degree, Will TraveLh Fed Up With Thankless Conditions,
Many Lawyers Are Taking a Hike, Timp, Dec. 11, 1989, at 106.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id.
See iiL
See id; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYERs 29-31 (1994).
See Sachs, supra note 35, at 106.
See id.

41. FULL DiscLosuRE: Do You REALLY WANT To BE A LAWYER? (Susan J.Bell et al.

eds., 1992).
42. DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW. WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETTING OUT OF TmE LEGAL PROFESSION (1989).
43. See Sachs, supra note 35, at 106.

44. See Steven Keeva, Opening the Mind's Eye, A.B.A. J.,
June 1996, at 49.
45. See GLENDON, supranote 38, at 37; SOL M. LiNownrz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION

2, 24 (1994); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Panthers and Pinstripes: The Case of Ezra
Pound and Archibald MacLeish, 63 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 907, 920-21, 929-31, 936 & n.228 (1990).
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"A whole new industry counsels lawyers who are unhappy with
their situation," Rodrigo interjected. 46 "They see lawyers who are
dejected and liken themselves to hamsters in a cage. Studies reveal
47
that many lawyers are dissatisfied, depressed, or even suicidal.
Some good students don't even try for law jobs."
"I bet you have something on that right there," I said, indicating
a pile of neatly clipped computer printouts nestled in Rodrigo's file
folder.
"Do I ever," Rodrigo replied. "One American Bar Association
study showed" - Rodrigo looked down - "a 'deterioration in the
lawyer workplace that will likely continue until law firms and other
employers begin to address the management practices that are
causing the problem.' 48 The same study showed that more attor49
neys describe themselves as seriously discontent than did in 1984."
"I have the impression this is even more true of women," I
added.5 0
"It is," Rodrigo said. "And it's on the rise for partners and senior associates as well as for sole practitioners and very young attorneys. Lawyers say the work atmosphere is not warm or
personal; that they have difficulty advancing; that the work is monotonous and pressured. Many describe themselves as burned out
or overstressed.51 An ABA survey found that more than half of
second-year associates in big firms were deeply dissatisfied.52 Even
the big paycheck cannot compensate for the long hours and tedious
detail. According to one analyst, '[mI]any of the smartest college
students don't know exactly what they want to do, so they turn to
one of modern society's last refuges for the generalist - law
school.' 53 Those who do well win summer clerkships, then first-year
46. See Sheila Nielsen, What Firms Do To Alleviate Attorney Dissatisfaction;Drastic
Tunes Call for Drastic Measures, ILL LEGAL TrnAs, Oct. 1995, at 6, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, ILT File; see also Lynne Pregenzer, Substance Abuse Within the Legal Pro.
fession: A Symptom of a Greater Malaise, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. E-mcs & Pun. POLY. 305,
308-15 (1993).
47. See Pregenzer, supra note 46, at 306, 320-21 (noting that lawyers have high rates of
depression and that many attorneys develop addictions to chemical substances as a coping
mechanism for job-related stress); see also Timothy Harper, The Best and Brightest, Bored
and Burned Out, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 28.
48. Ronald L. Hirsch, Is the Grass Greener? How Does Your Current Career Compare
with Others Across the Country?, in CHAN1iNGO Jons, A HANDBOOK FOR LAwYERS FOR THE

1990s, at 7 (Heidi L McNeil ed., 1994).
49. See id. at 9.
50. See id. at 11-14.
51. See Nielsen, supra note 46, at 6; see also Hirsch, supra note 48, at 15.
52. See Harper, supra note 47, at 28.
53. Id. at 29; cf. GLENDON, supra note 38, at 29.
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associateships making sixty, seventy thousand dollars a year or
more. But then they learn how solitary law practice is, with so
many hours passed in the library. Little time is spent with clients or
learning to be a wise counselor.5 4 One law graduate says: "There's
an incredible amount of dissatisfaction out there .... [Associates
would] come in and shut the door and literally start crying. So
many wanted to leave.., but felt they couldn't. There's a conspir55
acy of silence among people who doubt that the law is for them.1
"Former students of mine have told me they love the law and
their jobs," I added, "right up until the day they quit. One writes
me regularly about life on her strawberry farm. One of my top students - she had been in line to become partner at one of the most
prestigious law firms in Washington, D.C."
"Here's another one," Rodrigo exclaimed. "Twenty-three percent of New Jersey lawyers were certain they would leave law practice before they retire.56 The same percentage of North Carolina
lawyers said that if they had to do it all over again, they would not
become lawyers.5 7 A 1990 ABA study showed that about half of
lawyers in solo practice complain they do not have enough time.for
their families. 58 Three-fourths said they felt fatigued or exhausted
by the end of the workday.59 A report cosponsored by the A.B.A.
Young Lawyers Division and several other A.B.A. sections - entitled At the Breaking Point - found that lawyers in their early years
perceive law practice as almost unbearably intense.60 Associates
juggle several projects at the same time, working nine to twelve
'61
hours a day in the office and still taking work home."
"I understand that many lawyers prop themselves up with drugs
or alcohol." 62
54. See Harper, supra note 47, at 29.
55. Id. at 30 (quoting attorney Liza Yntema about her resignation from a large Chicago
law firm).
56. See Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here to Stay? Quality Time Losing Ou4
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 62.

57. See id.
58. See id.at 63-64.
59. See id. at 64.
60. See At the Breaking Point"A National Conference on the Emerging Crisisin the Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives - Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services, 1991 A.B.A.
SEcs. GEN. PRAC; LTG.; REAL PROP., PROB. AND Tn. L.; TORTS AND INs. PRAc.; AND
YOUNG LAW.DMSION 9.

61. See Holt, supra note 56, at 64.
62. See Richard L. Fricker, Frankly Speaking: Conversationswith Seven Lawyers, A.B.A.
J.,
Dec. 1992, at 69, 71.
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"Studies bear that out," Rodrigo replied. "Divorce is common,
as well. Some marriage counselors and psychiatrists have practices
devoted exclusively to attorneys. 63 One laid the blame on changes
in the structure of law and law practice. Forty or fifty years ago,
many who entered law were motivated by money. But others were
attracted by the intellectual challenge and opportunity to help people and society. Back then, law practice allowed you actually to
fulfill those aspirations. Today, it does not. Law and legal education take broad-based humanists and generalists and turn them into
narrow, driven specialists. Naturally, they end up unhappy." 64
"Did you find anything on specialization? Law today is much
more compartmentalized than it was when I was starting out."
"I did. A number of studies mentioned how unsatisfying it is for
many young associates to work on only one piece of a project over
and over again - say, document retrieval or analysis of damages.
They complain that they never see the clients or even the attorneys
working on other parts of the case." 65
"I've read of a felt decline in civility," I said. "Some articles
complain of hate speech directed by lawyers or judges against other
lawyers. 66 Others report dirty tricks and cutthroat tactics that oldtime practitioners never would have tolerated." 67
Rodrigo was silent for a moment. Then: "It just occurred to me
that the two types of discontent may be related. If lawyers believe
the public hates and distrusts them, their job satisfaction obviously
will be affected. Almost nine of every ten attorneys believe the image of the profession has been suffering. 68 The O.J. Simpson 'disgrace' didn't help, either, according to one study.69 New Jersey
Lawyer asked attorneys, 'Is the public becoming more antilawyer?'
63. See Martin Wald, Why a Law Firm Is Not a Business, LEGAL INTELUGENCER, Nov.
27, 1995, at 3, 10; cf. Sachs, supra note 35, at 106 (noting that an entire industry of career
counseling has arisen to assist unhappy attorneys).
64. See ARRON, supra note 42, at 5; Harper, supra note 47, at 30; Holt, supranote 56, at
66.
65. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 37-39; LiNowrrz, supra note 45, at 106; Harper, supra
note 47, at 30; Blue-Collar Law, CowNN. L. TRm., Nov. 20, 1995, at 39 (excerpting online
discussion from LEXIS Counsel Connect).
66. See Rocco Cammarere, Uncivil Lawyers, or Just Bad Image?, N.J. LAw., July 24,1995,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Legal News Library, NJLAWR File; Telephone Interview with
Andy Taslitz, Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law (Aug. 18, 1996) (member
of state bar task force addressing this problem).
67. See LrNowrrz, supra note 45, at 10, 14, 18, 104; Wald, supra note 63, at 3; Uncivil
Lawyers, supra note 66, at 1.
68. See Rocco Cammarere, How Lawyers See Their Image: From Bad to Worse, N.J.
LAW., Apr. 29, 1996, at 1, availablein LEXIS, Legal News Library, NJLAWR File.
69. See i.
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Eighty-six percent answered yes. 70 Only 12.1% said the image of
the lawyer is not deteriorating.7 Women are even more dissatisfied
with their professional lives than men are.72 Just a couple of
months ago, a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court lamented 'legal
capitalism' - the excessive influence of the profit motive in the
'73
practice of law."
"Ironic!" I exclaimed. "The Court has been a bastion and protector of corporations and capitalism."
"Scholars such as Mary Ann Glendon report the same thing that law is overcommercialized. 74 Oh, here's another poll. Seventy
percent of California lawyers would choose another line of work;
three-quarters would not want their children to be lawyers. 75 Sol
Linowitz says that today's lawyers and law firms no longer think of
law as a learned profession. They are 'hired guns' for whom winning is everything. 76 Lawyers no longer think of themselves as officers of the court. 77 As someone put it, 'the mechanics have
increasingly supplanted the humanists.' 78 No one reads for pleasure any more. Work leaves little quiet time or opportunity for
creativity. '79
A knock at the door caused both of us to start. "Giannina!"
Rodrigo exclaimed. "Come in."
I leaped to my feet. "I'm so glad to see you."
The slim, dark-haired young woman set down her backpack and
gave me, then Rodrigo, quick hugs. "I'm starved. My study group
went almost two hours late. Have you two been entertaining each
other?" Giannina looked down at the mess of papers on Rodrigo's
desk. "Law's troubles again?" Then, to me: "How was your
ffight?"
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Marjorie M. Shultz, Morale Problem: Study Sends Message to Law Firms, NAT..
L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 22, 23; see also Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the
Legal Profession: An EmpiricalStudy of Stanford Law Students and Graduates,40 STAN. L.
REv. 1209, 1222-23, 1245-46 (1988).
73. See Justice Laments Legal "Capitalism," DENVER PosT, May 26, 1996, at 17A.
74. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 40-59 (arguing that increased competition for business in the legal profession since the 1960s has resulted in the rise of litigation and
commercialization).
75. See Robert N. Saylor & Anna P. Engh, Litigators to Examine Lack of Funding,Access, NATL. L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at S3.
76. See LiNowrrL, supra note 45, at 10, 67; see also GLENDON, supranote 38, at 37.
77. See LxNowrrz, supra note 45, at 10.
78. Id. at 67.
79. See id. at 107; Holt, supra note 56, at 64; Keeva, supra note 44, at 52;.
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"Fine. I got in just three days ago. Saw the baby and my daughter. And now I want to get caught up on the two of you."
"No babies on our side, yet," Giannina said with a laugh. "But
I'm in law school, as Rodrigo no doubt told you. How's your
grandchild?"
"Both are fine. They named the little one after you. I'll have to
introduce all of you sometime. But for now, can I take you two out
to dinner? Talking makes me hungry. And your friend here seems
able to eat any time." I looked over at Rodrigo, who nodded vigorously. "Maybe we can find a quiet place. Rodrigo has been regaling me with tales of despair. But he promised to tell me his
theory of why the profession has been in such a tailspin. Have you
heard it?"
Giannina said, "I don't think so. But Rodrigo is never at a loss
for theories. He and Laz have been toiling away on this committee.
Although I must say, the first-year experience is so peculiar that it
practically begs for reform. I can't believe the Socratic method.
Professors seem to believe that not telling you something is more
educational than telling you. And the way lawyers write - it's
deplorable."
Giannina, a published poet and playwright, wrinkled her nose in
disgust. 80 "I've just gotten through moot court," she said. "The
idea seems to be that when writing a brief, the flatter and more
boring the better. My writing instructor is actually not too bad.
She knows how to put words on paper pretty decently and sometimes lets me get away with a metaphor or simile. But the structure
of a brief - I can't believe it. It goes against all the rules of good
writing. I thought of using a flashback technique, for example, in
my reply brief. She told me to get rid of it, for no good reason
other than it just isn't done."
I gave her a sympathetic look and added, "I know. Hang in
there. Will a bit of dinner help?"
II.
IN WHICH THE PROFESSOR AND GIANNINA HEAR
RODRIGO'S THESIS ABOUT LAW'S DISCONTENTS AND ATTEMPT

To

FIND AN EXPLANATION FOR WOMEN'S AND MINORITIES'

DISENCHANTMENT WITH LAW AND LAW SCHOOL

A few minutes later we were seated in a small but comfortable
Japanese restaurant that Giannina pronounced, "Fine. I like this
80. On Giannina's accomplishments in her pre-Rodrigo period, see Rodrigo's Sixth
Chronicle,supra note 1, at 640 n.3.
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place. They have good food, plus it's far enough from the law
school that I won't be running into uptight fellow students." The
waiter took our orders: vegetarian tempura for Giannina, some
sort of fish stew for my omnivorous friend Rodrigo, and scrambled
tofu ("It doesn't have MSG, I hope?") for me. The waiter filled our
teacups and departed.
"Now, Rodrigo," I said. "Why do you think that doctrinalism in
teaching and scholarship is responsible for law's woes? It's a little
counterintuitive. In fact, all the authorities your dean asked you to
look at diagnosed the problem in exactly the opposite way. I love
policy analysis and critical thought, as you know. But it seems to
me that turning out technically well-trained lawyers is a law school's
central mission. If lawyers knew their craft and made fewer mistakes, maybe the public and judges would like us more."
"Oh, we all have to know our craft," Rodrigo agreed. "The
question is what that craft is. Carrington, MacCrate, and Harry Edwards speak as though critical theory and interdisciplinary scholarship have very little place in legal theory or practice. In this, they
are completely wrong - one hundred percent off. Ignoring all
these realist-based approaches and obsessing over doctrine and lawas-science are what's responsible for our woes."8'
"I don't mind doctrine," Giannina said quietly, "up to a point.
But I've noticed that most of the professors, including some of the
young ones, cut off discussion when it wanders too far afield, when
it begins to get into politics, or when a student wants to talk about
feelings. Even though the classes are plenty challenging, a sameness is beginning to set in. How does this case square with that?
Can this rule and that be reconciled? What difference would it
have made in the court's result if the plaintiff were blind, lefthanded, or a child? All my fellow students are beginning to comment on this. So, I'm curious why you think a steady diet of this is
bad for you."
"Me, too," I chimed in.
Rodrigo took a deep draft of his tea. "Laz and I were talking
about this the other day. In fact, it's his idea that something is
wrong with doctrinalism. But it's because he loves law and eco81. On legal realism, see supranote 13 and sources cited therein. Developed in the 1920s
as a reaction to the crude scientism of Langdellian thought, realism holds that law's essence is
experience, not science or any other form of mechanical precision. According to the early
realists, judges decide cases not on the basis of precedent - blindly and mechanically followed - but of politics, practicality, instinct, experience, and wise social policy. Realism
later spun off critical legal studies, feminism, critical race theory, and other such approaches.
See Mensch, supranote 13, at 26-29.
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nomics and thinks the curriculum slights his favorite approach. All
the public-law courses teach about the majesty of Brown v. Board
of Education,82 Marbury v. Madison,83 and all the other big liberal
cases, over and over, he said, with very little about judicial restraint
and other notions dear to conservatives. We're buddies, even
though he's the sponsor of the local Federalist Society, as I may
have mentioned."
"And yet you're best friends," I said with wonderment. "For a
conservative, he certainly seems ecumenical: he gets along fine
with minorities like you, as well as persons of his own persuasion.
He also feels passionately about social justice and poverty, if I
recall."
"His family grew up poor. Anyway, we had a good long talk,
after which I did some more thinking. I think formalism - the sort
of thing Judge Edwards and Paul Carrington admire and the MacCrate Report champions - is responsible for law's laments in a
number of ways, some of which have special force for minorities."
"We'd love to hear them," Giannina and I broke in
simultaneously.
A. Rodrigo's First Connection: The Mechanical Quality of
Doctrinalism and Scientific Jurisprudenceas Responsible
for Law's Discontents
"I realize this is paradoxical," Rodrigo began. "But I believe
that legal formalism - the kind of teaching and scholarship that all
three of our authorities hold up as the ideal - makes matters
worse, not better."
"That is paradoxical," I agreed. "Everyone thinks the opposite.
This had better be good."
"You can decide for yourselves," Rodrigo replied evenly. "It's
like prescribing that someone go stand in the rain to get rid of a
cold. Today's exaggerated focus on doctrine and case law contributes to law's low estate in at least five separate ways."
"Your discussions always seem to break down into four or five
parts," Giannina interjected with a wry smile. "You're like one of
my professors. Everything is either a three- or a four-part test."
"Sounds like a doctrinalist," Rodrigo replied with a smile. We
all paused as the waiter set our plates down before us. "This looks
good," Rodrigo said, dipping a fried shrimp in some sort of yellow82. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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ish sauce. "A five-course meal to go with a five-part analysis. My
favorite evening."
"Mine, too," I said, patting my stomach a little ruefully. "And
how do MacCrate, Harry Edwards, and Carrington prescribe exactly the wrong cure?"
"The first way those three giants - who, incidentally, are quite
correct about the problem - err is by overlooking the mechanical
quality of law-as-doctrinalism."
"It certainly makes for a dull classroom," Giannina chimed in.
"Several of mine are that way. The professor never gets to the big
issues, the ones we're all dying to discuss. But how does that cause
the laments you two were discussing earlier?"
"It's not responsible for all of them," Rodrigo replied. "For
that, we need the other critiques I'll share with you in a minute.
But mechanical jurisprudence 84 goes hand-in-hand with emotional
insensitivity and underdevelopment of law students and lawyers.
It's the famous 'hired gun' mentality that the public accuses us of.
Lawyers seem to them equally prepared to take either side of a
case, with no personal attachment or conviction." 85
"I don't agree," I said. "In the criminal law, for example, our
system holds that every defendant is entitled to a lawyer. If lawyers
were to decide on which side justice lies and were to refuse to take
the other, half the cases would have no lawyer."
"It's not a case of black and white," Rodrigo conceded.
"Rather, a subtle quality of mind sets in. Lawyers come to strike
their clients as mere craftsmen, going through the paces, citing cases
and precedent, highlighting the worst-case scenario, and so on,
when the client's life or property may be on the line. Several of the
clinical theorists, like Lucie White and Anthony Alfieri mention
this. 86 The lawyer is cold and technical, wanting victory above all.
The client, who may be poor or black, wants something else. Good
lawyering is more an art form than a science. Under the apprenticeship system that prevailed until not so long ago, lawyers learned
to use intuition and creativity to solve problems, more than they do
84. "Mechanical jurisprudence" is the term of belittlement some of the early realists applied to early Langdellian formalism. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8
COLuM. L. Rnv. 605 (1908) (describing mechanical jurisprudence and showing its defects and
conceptual impossibilities).
85. See supra notes 21-24, 63-64, 76 and accompanying text.
86. See, ag., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: LearningLessons
of Client Narrative,100 YALE L.J. 2107,2109-13 (1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Bui. L. REv.
1, 23-26 (1990).
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in today's Socratic classroom. Even Paul Carrington acknowledges
that technocratic learning can 'dehumanize' and that law professors
need to teach the 'effective use of intuition going beyond technical
knowledge'87 and precedent. The apprenticeship system included
hands-on learning in a practical setting. There are much better
ways to teach imaginative lawyering."
"If you mean clinical classes," Giannina interjected, "I'm greatly
looking forward to taking some of those next year. Unfortunately,
our school is thinking of closing one of its two clinics. The immigration clinic just lost its funding due to federal cutbacks."
"Bad news," Rodrigo commiserated. "Because clinical classes
would help. But they must offer theory, too. Otherwise they can
easily become mere cookie-cutter exercises in which an experienced
practitioner drills a student in the practitioner's favorite way of handling a certain kind of case. This sort of teaching, as much as the
Socratic classroom where formalism holds sway, can ignore a whole
range of questions. Both teach instrumental reasoning: If you want
to get from A to B, use C or D. Cite the right holding. Bring your
case under a certain rule. The means by which an attorney can
achieve an end for his or her client should be independently morally justifiable. But the ends should be as well. As Sol Linowitz
says, we are a profession that no longer can say no to the desires of
a client.88 The action may be technically legal, but it may be an
abominable thing to do to a consumer, say.89 It may also not be
what Mrs. G. wants. 90 The mechanical approach says, go ahead and
do it anyway."
"I'm not sure I would go that far," I said. "It seems to me a
lawyer needs to know technique just as much as he or she needs to
have a firm grasp of values. If you have the right values but don't
know how to advance the client's cause because you don't know the
precedents or statutes, your advocacy is going to be a mess. Your
critique needs more than that, Rodrigo, to convince me, at least."
"I do have more," Rodrigo replied. "Mechanical jurisprudence
goes hand-in-hand with some unlovely traits, including hyperaggressiveness and extreme obsession with production - billable
hours and rainmaking over all. A focus in law school on borderline
87. Carrington, supra note 6, at 224, 226.
88. See Lnwowrrz, supranote 45, at 88.
89. See id. at 10, 13-14, 18, 67 (noting that law was once an honorable profession and
lately has become obsessed with winning at all costs, and urging that lawyers can do better).
90. See White, supranote 86, at 28-32 (describing the trial of Mrs. G., a client who wanted
dignity more than a conventionally defined legal victory).
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cases - which, of course, are the only ones in the casebook fosters a litigator's mentality. Lawyers learn to love to fight, in part
because the cases on which they cut their teeth are ones in which
someone staged a full-scale battle with someone else.91 The curriculum neglects planning, mediation, and prevention of the mess in
the first place. We don't train law students to be wise counselors
and conciliators, much less to understand and empathize with clients from radically different cultures. We train them to be killers.
The focus on appellate cases is one reason why."
Rodrigo was quiet for a moment. I took a bit of my tofu, swallowed, and then said: "You said something about obsession with
production."
"Oh, that's right," Rodrigo said, offering Giannina, then me, a
morsel of his own steaming dish. After depositing small portions
neatly on our plates with his chopsticks, he continued. "If citing
cases and filing papers is all there are in life, then the only thing
that separates you from the next lawyer is doing more of it. With
case law, you go round and round in little circles like a hamster on a
treadmill." 92
"And witness the rise of the Rambo lawyer," I added. "The
lawyer who places winning above all. Older lawyers say that there
weren't that many of them just fifteen years ago. 93 Maybe the return to case law and doctrine has something to do with it."
"I'm sure it does," Rodrigo agreed. "But the means of production and the conditions of making a livelihood also have taken a
turn for the worse, so that even more humane teaching and theory
couldn't solve all of our problems. Doctrinalism is a discourse of
power, of mastery. Like positivist thought in early social science, it
serves the rise of specialization and meshes well with the profitmaking motive already prevalent in our capitalist society. 94 The
rise of the megafirm, the introduction of departments within firms,
91. That is: a trial, an appeal, and frequently a second or even third appeal.
92. See Pierre Schlag, Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053, 2054-55 (1993) (questioning whether judicial reliance on case precedent is actually criticallegal analysis); Schlag,
supra note 13, at 188-89 (arguing that legal reasoning is circular and inscribed and creates
boredom in practitioners); see also Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a
Critique of Normativity in Legal Though4 139 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 936-54 (1991) (arguing
that the dominant normative discourse is manipulable, stereotyped, and clich6 ridden).
93. See GLENDON, supra note 38, at 74-84.
94. See generally MAx HoRHrmnmER, EcLiPsE oF REASON 75-91 (1947) (critiquing positivism); MAX WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCaOLOGY (H.P. Secher trans., Peter Owen 1962)
(1925) (describing the rise of corporate organization and the regulatory state); MAX WEBER,
THE PROTEsTANT ETmIc AND THE Spi=RT OF CAPrrALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 2d ed.
1976) (1930) (discussing the values of a capitalist society).
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and the decline of the generalist all are aspects of the same thing.
Doctrinalism is a cause of all this, but it is also a symptom of something broader."
"With that I think I agree," I said.
Giannina also nodded vigorously and then added, "It's a discourse of mastery. The case method and Socratic teaching foster
arrogance, not humility. They reward the confident, snap answer
rather than the thoughtful, modest response. I see it in my classes
every day.95 The competitive individualism these traditional methods foster carries over into daily life. All my classmates notice that
they have become more argumentative. Three couples have divorced in my first-year class alone, and the year isn't half finished.
It stands to reason that the habits of mind inculcated by the traditional classroom could carry over into practice and replicate overzealous, uncollegial advocacy and relations inside the bar."
"Older practitioners complain that civility is declining, and that
lawyers treat each other with less respect, both in and out of the
courtroom,1 96 I went on. "The educational goal may be to develop
effective advocates, but doctrinalism contains no stopping points,
no built-in checks. It goes hand-in-hand with confrontationalism
and rabid advocacy at the expense of interpersonal decency, communicative skills, empathy, and justice. Negotiation, counseling,
and compromise are fast becoming lost arts. In my day, a few
professors emphasized these things. Today, I get the impression
hardly any do."
"Maybe that is part of the reason why women and minorities of
color are unhappy with the law and the legal classroom," Giannina
said. "I was just reading Professor Guinier's study.97 It mirrors
some of the complaints I've read about from young women in the
bar. If so, things won't change until we resolve to teach and practice differently."
"Just as it would counsel that we shy away from the CarringtonEdwards prescription in our scholarship," Rodrigo added. "And
this concludes my first point. Should we order dessert? I think I
can go through my other critiques a little more quickly."
95. See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences At One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 46 (1994) ("Many women report, however, that
when speaking feels like a 'performance,' they respond with silence rather than participation,
especially when the Socratic method is employed to intimidate or to establish a hierarchy
within large classes.").
96. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
97. Guinier et al., supra note 95.
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I looked at my watch. "My daughter and her husband turn in
around ten. I've got some time, if you two do."
Giannina nodded and summoned the waiter, who materialized
quickly, dessert menus in hand. We ordered - candied yams for
my rail-thin friend, mango sherbet for Giannina and me. After the
waiter departed, Rodrigo resumed as follows:
B. Rodrigo's Second Connection: Extreme Doctrinalism
Dehumanizes Clients and Legal Problems - The
Anarchy-and-Elegance Critique
"The second connection is related to the first. Legal formalism
breeds dissatisfaction with the legal profession, on the parts of both
the public and lawyers, because it mistakenly tries to make law a
science. 98 Law deals with people and the myriad fact situations in
which they find themselves, rather than the orderly and relatively
predictable phenomena of, say, chemistry or physics. The attempt
to map scientific epistemology onto a humanistic subject naturally
produces frustration. People are not like molecules, solar systems,
or microbes; their behavior is not like that of liquid in a tube or
objects on an inclined plane. Chris Goodrich wrote a fine book
(Giannina and I both nodded to show we were familiar with it)
about law and law school. 99 A journalist who spent a year at Yale
Law School in a program for journalists and writers, he wrote about
how law, with its elegant structures of rules and principles, struggles
to come to terms with an unruly world. In the words of his title, the
law represents elegance; daily life; anarchy. He marveled at how
well the elegant lectures and treatises he absorbed did the trick.
But I think if he had stuck around for another year or two - or,
better yet, visited a busy city court - he would have been more
tempered in his praise. Formalism tries to make law a science, reducing human factors and fact patterns into pre-existing forms
called precedent. It minimizes the role of judgment, experience,
politics, love, compassion, discretion, and what our friend Duncan
Kennedy calls 'intersubjective zap." 00 Critical legal studies tells us
that these other things are all there is, which I don't agree with. But
even the more modified scientism of legal process and Paul Car98. In other words, with one right answer. See supra note 13.
99. See Cmus GooDRIcH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIsT
AT YALE LAW SCHOOL (1991).
100. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 11
(1984) ("It's a distanced, mocking ironization of the mode of discourse in which you have
abstract, analytically specified goal language, which is supposed to be the context and set the
boundaries and be the reassuring structure for behavior.").
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rington manifestly give less scope than CLS and Derrick Bell do to
politics, history, compassion, instinct, and all the rest."'' 1
"That's certainly true," Giannina replied. "I've been studying
Duncan Kennedy in my reading group."
"Didn't you meet him last year?" Rodrigo asked.
"No, I was out of town when he spoke. You told me he was
amazing."
"He was. Judges, however, being busy bureaucrats with large
case loads, do not much like that role. They prefer to think of
themselves as technicians whose hands are tied when they send
prisoners to jail, deny welfare rights to the poor, reduce recovery
for consumers injured by dangerous products, and so on. 10 2 Clients
also feel something is wrong when they find their own lawyer taking
the other side and spelling out for them the worst case scenario.
They want a friend, and they get a laboratory technician. 'Mr.
Jones, I'm sorry, but your test shows you have cancer. Please make
an appointment next week with the doctor.'"
"Your scientific example reminds me - we seem to be back to
10 3
positivism again. You mentioned that earlier, if I recall.'
"I guess I did," Rodrigo exclaimed, seemingly pleased at discovering how his critiques fit together. "Dissatisfaction with mechanistic law may be part of a more general movement away from rigid,
pseudoscientific approaches toward 'softer,' more modest, interdisciplinary ones. 10 4 This new emphasis came on the heels of widespread criticism, mainly from philosophers and critical social
scientists, some in Europe, of positivist epistemologies. In the old,
discredited paths, social scientists would try to see human behavior
as subject to unvarying rules, independent of social context. These
'dominant discourses,' as they came to be called, ultimately failed
because they marginalized subjectivity, ignored perspective and
positionality. They simply could not deal adequately with the het101. See e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the political and social forces that shape law at least as much as doctrine); Gabel &
Kennedy, supra note 100 (same).
102. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 84547 (1991) (comparing Dworkin's ideal judge, "Hercules," to normative legal thinkers who
struggle to persuade decisionmakers to stretch positive law to achieve a particular result).
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.

104. On this general change, see, for example, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOoY OF HUMAN SCIENCES (R.D. Laing ed., Random House 1970)
(1966); THOMAS KurN, THE STRucruRE OF ScrN'c REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); GARY
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS 1-6 (1995).
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erogeneity of social life and the situated, contingent nature of
knowledge."1 05
"Well put. But I assume you mean human knowledge, not physics and mathematics," I said, resolving to push Rodrigo as long as
possible.
"Well, at least in that realm, and maybe in math and science too.
I assume you are familiar with Kuhn and the study of the sociology
of science that he pioneered?" 106
"I am," I said.
"Even scientific knowledge is constructed and has an element of
convention. A real world exists outside of us, of course. But how
we choose to describe it is contingent and subject to differing interpretations at different times." 107
"Granted," Giannina broke in. "But I'm still not sure what all
this has to do with the public's dissatisfaction with law and lawyers.
Science clings tenaciously to past paradigms, embraces objectivism,
and yet the public worships scientists. Why is this a special problem
for lawyers?"
"Nice question," Rodrigo conceded. "One reason has to do
with the habits of mind it creates. We talked about those before. 08
Another is the client's sense that you simply are not on the same
wavelength as he or she is, that you don't care about - or even
understand - the human dimensions of his or her situation. You
talk about funny things - 'material elements' of a cause of action,
and so on. 10 9 You slice their problem up into little pieces, so that
they end up hardly recognizing it.110 You translate their injury into
105. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER &

THOMAS LucKMANN,

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF

REALITY (1966) (describing the situatedness and power dimension of what we call knowledge); MICHEL FOuCAuLT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRrr-

INGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980); see also Derrick Bell &
Erin Edmonds, Students as Teachers, Teachers as Learners, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2025, 2038
(1993) (characterizing Judge Edwards' article as advocating positivism).

106. See KuHN, supra note 104.
107. See id, at 92-135 (discussing changes in scientific thought and description); see also
WERNER HEISENBERO, PHYSICS AND PILosoPty: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE

(Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 1958) (same); STEPHEN TOULMIN, FORESImH AND UNDERSTANDING: AN ENQUIRY iNro THE Aims OF SCIENCE (1961) (exploring the evolution of scientific

ideas).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 84-98 (discussing traits and emotional responses
of lawyers).
109. See Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle,supra note 1, at 81-85, 87-92 (discussing emotional
and professional gaps that separate lawyers from their clients).
110. See id. at 81-82, 87 (noting that pleading rules make little accommodation for storytelling and narrative).
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something they may hardly recognize."' Good lawyering requires
engagement, manipulation, and strategy. It requires judgment and
knowledge of human beings and their motives. It requires the ability to see the world in shades of gray, acting fearlessly in situations
of factual uncertainty and even moral ambiguity."
"I know what you're going to say," Giannina said with excitement in her voice. "Good lawyering requires great literature, psychology, social science, and even religion." 2 All these may be
better models than science for what lawyers do - good ones, anyway." (I recalled that in her pre-law school life, Giannina had been
a poet and playwright, publishing a number of volumes and even
winning a prize or two.)
"So," Giannina went on, "you think that the illness in lawyers'
souls comes from denial - the failure to deal straightforwardly
with the way one sometimes manipulates, lies, fudges, and generally
maneuvers to promote your clients' ends. 1" 3
"Which, optimistically, include justice," Rodrigo added. "Formalism leaves you with no moral anchor. You go out into the
world, confront its anarchy, and quickly become cynical. Doctors
deal with sick people; lawyers, sometimes anyway, with bad ones.
But formalism looks the other way, concealing all this. It's as
though doctors were trained only in science, not in how to take care
of sick people."
"I had a doctor like that once," Giannina shuddered. "He was a
terrific technician but had a horrible bedside manner. I quickly
changed to another."
"Would you folks like some coffee?" asked the waiter, who had
materialized at the side of our table. "We have cappuccino, decaf,
and herbal teas."
"Decaf for me," I said.
"Make mine the real thing," said my high-energy young friend.
"I'll pass," said Giannina. Then after the waiter left: "Although
you can't do that in a Socratic classroom."
"It's a different discourse," said Rodrigo with a wink. "In restaurants, no one pretends everyone else is the same. But some harried judges and lawyers do. The crits who are calling attention to
111. See id.at 81-83, 87 (arguing that in civil rights cases the injured party has to prove
her injury by telling the other party's story).
112. See JAMES B. WHrrE, H RAc Es' Bow (1985) (making this general claim).
113. See Schlag, supra note 102, at 811, 850 (noting that the normative legal thinker constructs arguments to support norms that agree with the legal thinker's own moral values,
political values, or both).
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law's contingency and political underpinnings may be speaking for
the widespread feelings of impoverishment many feel throughout
the legal community. This is especially so of the growing minority
communities, who are most poorly served of all by cookie-cutter
law. Far from teaching cynicism or neglect of craft, the new critical
scholars may be in tune with the public and its needs. 114 Carrington, MacCrate, and Harry Edwards put their fingers on what's
wrong. But they err in their prescription, urging instead what will
only make matters worse."
"Like that brilliant doctor I had once," Giannina said. "He prescribed a regimen that should have worked, ignoring that my body
was different from that of the usual person. I changed doctors fast.
Oh, here's your coffee. Actually, it looks good."
"Will you have some, Miss?" the waiter asked. "We do have
decaf."
"Okay. I'll have a decaf latt6, if you have it."
"We can make it," the waiter said and departed.
"He's like a good lawyer," all three of us said at once.
"He didn't stick to the menu," said Giannina.
C. Rodrigo's Third Connection: Formalism and Doctrinal
Pedagogy Deflect Us From Things That Matter
As the waiter wrote down her order and walked away, Rodrigo
looked up at his friend.
"Giannina, do you remember how you said that formalism is a
type of massive denial?" 115 (Giannina nodded.) "Well, my third
critique builds on that. I think formalism, whether in legal scholarship, teaching, or practice, is bad for our souls and our ethics. It
narrows political options. And it predisposes lawyers to developing
the bad characteristics that some of the public accuse us of having."
"Oh, dear," Giannina sighed. "I knew I should have stayed with
writing. I made less than three thousand dollars most years, but if
you're right, at least I was able to preserve my immortal soul."
Rodrigo shot her an inquiring look. "I expect this to be the
most controversial part of my thesis. Nobody likes being told their
soul is in danger."
"Get on with it," I said. "The public already thinks we're a
bunch of unscrupulous sharks. If you can draw a connection be114. See Rodrigo's First Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1365-76 (pointing out the utility of
critical analysis and minority viewpoints to developed societies mired in stasis).
115. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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tween their low opinion and the way we think, write, and practice,
come right out and say so. It can't hurt and might do some good."
"Let's take the least controversial part first," Rodrigo said, stirring his characteristic four teaspoons of sugar into his coffee. "Formalism is a deflection. It points you neatly away from the things
that matter. This is bad for you and, in the long run, for your
reputation."
"By deflection, I assume you mean from politics," Giannina
ventured. "I've been reading The Politics of Law in my reading
group. 116 So if that's your point, it's not exactly new."
Rodrigo shot her a quick look. "I do think the crits are right,
but I had something a little different in mind. Have you gotten to
Erie v. Tompkins 1 7 yet in Civil Procedure?
"We're starting it next week. I've read it, though. I often skip
around in the casebook if I find something interesting."
"Then you know Erie is about the distribution of judicial power
between the federal and state judiciaries. It's essentially a choiceof-law case. What you may not know yet is that a sort of mystique
surrounds it.118 Many consider it one of the handful of most important cases in American law - the fulcrum that separates the state
and federal judiciaries, that allocates power between the two levels
of government. It's said to be the cornerstone of our federalist
system."" 9
"My goodness," Giannina exclaimed. "At first glance it just
looked like an interesting choice-of-law case about somebody who
happened to be walking along a railroad."
"In the eyes of many, it's much more than that," Rodrigo elaborated. "It tells us when a state versus a federal judge has the right
to proclaim the common law. In diversity of citizenship cases, it
says that federal courts must look to state substantive law rules, but
may apply their own procedure. In federal-question cases, more or
less the opposite prevails."
"Nice and neat," Giannina commented. "But why is the case
considered so important? It just seems to say that an earlier decision, Swift v. Tyson, 20 was wrong - that is, too narrow - in its
116. See THm Poancs OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
117. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

118. This mystifying quality of the famous case was first pointed out to me by my colleague Leon Letwin.
119. See CHARLES A. Wmorrr, FEDERAL COURTS 374, 377 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing
Erie's prominence and importance in American law).
120. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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application of the Federal Rules of Decision Act, requiring that federal judges, sitting in diversity, bow only to state law incorporated
squarely in a statute."
"According to the usual view, it's the cornerstone of federalism,
setting up the limits of federal judicial power and carving out a region of state autonomy."
"Well, I can see how it's at least a moderately important case,"
Giannina said. "I assume you think the opposite. Such a contrarian! Why do you think the case is unimportant or misguided?"
"It's not misguided," Rodrigo replied. "It may well be rightly
decided. What I think is curious, though, is the veneration
showered on it by a number of very bright people. There's practically a cult following, going back to Justice Frankfurter and the
Harvard school of institutional analysis, which holds that the most
important questions have to do with determining which person, authority, or branch of government is the most appropriate decisionmaker for a particular question."
"A kind of latter-day formalism!" Giannina exclaimed.
"Exactly," Rodrigo replied. "A way of avoiding hard substantive questions. It is important to know whether a federal or a state
judge has the right to declare the common law, for example on tort
duties toward trespassers who walk along railroad tracks at night.121
But in another sense, Erie is a trivial case. I hope I'm not poisoning
your mind."
"Thank you very much, Professor," Giannina said. "But what
I'd really love to know is why you think it isn't such a big deal."
"Well, consider the profile of the typical federal judge," Rodrigo
replied. "How old? Say, fifty-five. Which color? White. Male.
Socially moderate to conservative. Lives in a nice suburban community. Went to a good, but probably not great, law school. Plays
golf on Sundays. Has two or three kids."
"I suppose you're going to say we need to do better than that,"
Giannina replied.
"We should, although that's not my point."
"Oh?" Giannina said inquiringly.
"Now consider the profile of the average state judge. Fifty-five
years old. A moderate Republican. White. Male. Went to a good,
but not great law school. Plays golf on Sundays. My point is that
the two sets of judges look pretty much alike. Not exactly, of
course. The federal judiciary is sometimes a little better, a little
121. See Erie 304 U.S. at 69-71 (setting out the facts and choice-of-law issue in the case).
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more select. But the similarities overwhelm the differences. Erie,
however, creates a huge fuss over which white, male, moderate Republican, fifty-five year old judge gets to have his version of the
common law applied to the case at hand. Now, I'm not saying it
makes no difference who gets to do so, in railroad cases or in any
other. But there are very few female, black, working class, or gay
or lesbian judges. Few with disabilities. Few younger than thirtyfive. Few single mothers. Few with working-class roots."' 22
"Now that's a question that really matters," I said.
"Yet the Erie line of cases neatly blinds us to it, focusing instead
on whether Tweedle Dee or Tweedle Dum gets to declare the law.
This is what I mean by a deflection. Doctrinalism, the worship of
the conventionally framed question, blinds us to questions that really matter, ones of power and authority."
"You're not saying Erie is unimportant, are you?" I asked.
"Not at all. I'm merely saying that its importance is overblown.
And if we focus single-mindedly on the question it asks, and don't
ask the other one, we'll never get anywhere."
"Now that's a serious critique," I conceded. "To me, it's more
forceful than the first one. But is it limited to a few big cases like
Erie? If so, the cure for doctrinalism would be simply to remind
ourselves that the case is not the be-all and end-all, that many important questions remain even after this one is addressed - such as
the racial composition of the very judiciary that propounds the
rule."
"I think the risk is general," Rodrigo replied. "Are you familiar,
Professor, with Laurence Tribe's notion of structural due process?"'3

"You mean his suggestion about an interaction between procedural law and social change?"'

24

122. For information on the makeup of the state and federal judiciaries, see ALMANAC OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAxY (Christine Housen et al. eds., 1996) (containing profiles and evalu-

ations of all judges in the federal district and circuit courts); 1996 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY 659-928 (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1996) (containing the biographies of 1900 federal
judges); THE AMERiCAN BENCH (Marie T. Finn et al. eds., 8th ed. 1995/96) (containing nearly
18,000 biographies of judges from all levels of both the federal and state court systems); see
also Susan Maloney Smith, Diversifyingthe Judiciary: The Influence of Genderand Race on
Judging, 28 U. RIcH. L. Rnv. 179, 179-81 (1994) (laying out statistics that show the relative
lack of women and minority judges in both federal and state courts).
123. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEImcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 17-1, 17-2, 17-3 (2d
ed. 1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RIv. 269

(1975).
124. See TRIBE, supra note 123, at 1674 ("Inescapable is the substantive question: given
the relevant social and economic realities, which path now points away from domination in a
constitutionally relevant sense?"); Tribe, supranote 123, at 269 (urging that a third category
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"Exactly. He proposed that judges and other legal decisionmakers apply rules and procedures with an eye to the moral
and political status of the case being adjudicated. Cases that present few novel or controversial issues ought to be adjudicated summarily, via streamlined procedures and under uniform, bright-line,
across-the-board rules. Cases that present novel, controversial issues ought to be treated differently. These other cases ought to be
aired fully, openly, and by means of procedures that allow full consideration of the entire range of issues they present. 125 Examples of
such cases, lying in, the zone of moral flux, might include constitutional challenges to sodomy statutes or cases concerning women's
procreative rights or the right to die."
"So you are saying that with cases falling within what you call
the zone of moral flux, we benefit by forcing ourselves to undertake
serious, prolonged analyses?" Giannina asked.
"Tribe thinks so," Rodrigo replied. "Doing so will enable us
more rapidly to arrive at consensus. When this happens, adjudication may become more summary and routinized. We can then use
presumptions, summary judgment, tight evidentiary rules, and other
devices to confine discussion to the most centrally relevant points,
since we will know what they are, and eliminate the others."
"A sensible approach," I commented. "Saves time and effort.
One is not constantly reinventing the wheel."
"And quite liberal," Giannina added. "It seems to me an outgrowth of institutional analysis, as you mentioned before. Curvefitting. And I suppose you think it has a flavor of formalism about
it?"
"It does," Rodrigo acknowledged. "Consider the contrast with
critical legal studies. CLS points out that vast reaches of law are
shot through with contradiction and indeterminacy. 126 A judge deciding a case can invoke different principles and precedents and
come to diametrically opposite conclusions. 127 We use rules and
rights to make it appear as though law is fair, neutral - a science
of constitutional limitation exists that focuses on the structures through which policies are
both formed and applied).
125. See Tmn, supra note 123, at 1675-76 (same); Tribe, supra note 123, at 310 (urging
that the judiciary focus its concern not just on substance and procedure but also on the structure of the dialogue between the state and those whose liberty is constrained by the laws of
the state).
126. See generally CriticalLegal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv.1 (1984).
127. See eg., Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories,36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 114-16
(discussing indeterminacy and contradiction in law).
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with only one right answer. 128 Legal discourse and all the elements
of legal culture - legal education, the bar exam, the rituals, robes,
and esoteric jargon - all serve to conceal a series of result-oriented
replications of the status quo. Why do we put up with this? CLS's
answer is that the myth of law's objectivity and rationality compels
our loyalty."
"In short, we are persuaded by law's veneer of fairness to believe it actually serves our interests when it does not," Giannina
interjected. "David Kairys says much the same thing."'1 29
"CLS's solution, though, is not revolution in the ordinary sense.
Most CLS writers are idealists who believe our main chains are
mental. Because of the mystifying ideology with which we are all
imbued, we cannot conceive of a better world, one based on love
and cooperation. We are taught that the rule of law in its majesty
must be preserved even though it does injustice in Mrs. G's case. 130
The crits' solution, then, is to think and teach, to move methodically
from one area of the law to the next, showing the political, contingent, interest-serving nature of doctrine in each area. In this program of 'trashing,' CLS scholars draw on methodologies such as
neo-Marxism, literary interpretation, and structural analysis.' 31
"I think I see where you are going," I interjected, snapping
erect. "You are saying that CLS challenges Tribe's liberal thesis, in
fact stands it on its head. Liberal theory focuses on the difficult, or
controverted, case - the Brown v. Boardof Education 32 or Erie v.
Tomkins133 - to which it devotes lavish attention. CLS, by contrast, says that we must be most on guard regarding matters and
issues that seem routine - ones that seem comfortable and familiar, that have been relegated to 'rules.' The familiarity and comfort
these rules give us - their 'naturalness' - mean that they are most
likely to form part of the ideology by which we submit to illegitimate domination."
"The tyranny of the ordinary," Rodrigo replied. "Judge Edwards' notion of practical scholarship suffers from the same vice.
Practical scholarship greases the wheels. It helps judges accomplish
128. See supra notes 13, 81 and accompanying text (discussing this Langdellian vision).
129. See DAviD KAiRYs, WrrH LIBERTY AND JUSrCE FOR SOME 186-87 (1993) (noting
that law's unstated agenda mystifies and induces our consent to a seemingly fair structure
that in reality does injustice).
130. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
131. See eg., Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984) (describing critical
program of deconstruction and its techniques and strategies).

132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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more easily and smoothly what they are doing already. But the
point of scholarship -

theoretical or clinical -

ought to be to

make judging harder, not easier. A judge might say he or she wants
useful scholarship, but useful to whom? As Judge Posner puts it-"
Rodrigo paused for a moment while he shuffled some papers he
had brought. "'Perhaps the ultimate criterion of all scholarship is
utility, but it need not be utility to a particular audience. u 34 He
goes on to describe legal scholarship as second-rate, but writes that
he has nevertheless found much of it important 135 - in short, legal
scholarship is a 'high-risk, low return activity.' ",136
We were all silent for a moment, absorbing what Rodrigo had
said. Then, I said: "To summarize then, Rodrigo, you believe the
doctrinalist counterrevolution is fundamentally misdirected. Edwards and Carrington ignore that in times of change, like now, the
familiar is where the greatest danger lies; reform may be the most
practical thing. Outsider and critical scholarship, of both the theoretical and clinical variety, may be what our profession needs most.
The call for a return to doctrine is a form of collective denial."
"Many of my most doctrinal classes," Giannina began, "seem to
have had the least practical effect in the real world. For example,
doctrinal approaches to criminal law have had little or no effect in
reducing the crime rate or understanding the forces that lead to
crime. They lead to cases like McClesky v. Kemp, 137 which pretend
that race does not exist and that a form of sterile neutralism compels us to ignore what everybody knows."
"Speaking of denial," Rodrigo interjected tactfully. "It's getting
late, and the Professor may be tired. Do we need to think about
calling it quits soon?"
"I'm going strong," I insisted. "I'd love to hear your two final
connections. If it gets too close to ten o'clock, I'll just call and ask
them to leave a key under the mat. This is all very stimulating. Did
I tell you I'm serving as a consultant to Mexico's national law
school? They're thinking of reorganizing their curriculum more
along American lines. I'd like to be able to report the good as well
as the bad. So, please go ahead. If you have the energy, I have the
time."
134. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalizationof Legal Teaching and Scholarship,91
MxcH. L. REv. 1921, 1928 (1993).
135. See id. at 1927 (listing names of interdisciplinary and outsider scholars he considers
significant).
136. Id. at 1928.
137. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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D. Rodrigo's Fourth Connection: Doctrinalism Dulls the Moral
Senses and Injures Minorities and Women
"I'm glad you find this useful. You're a great sounding board,
Professor. Giannina and I are both in your debt. We hope you
have a lot of grandchildren and make dozens of return trips to this
country."
"You two can always come down to see me," I pointed out.
"Other than that one visit, you haven't been down at all. My art
collection has grown considerably since you were last there. I'd
love to show you my new pieces."
"Just as we'd love to see them," said Giannina with alacrity.
"You also promised to introduce me to your friends in that writers'
colony. I'll definitely be down, even if Rodrigo won't," she concluded, smiling at Rodrigo so he would see she was only half serious. "What's your theory about formalism's ethical deficiencies?"
"Formalism and its pedagogical equivalent," Rodrigo began,
"rely on appellate cases. They have to - that's where the law resides. These cases have relatively few facts and a great deal of doctrine and case shuffling. No party stands before the court - that
happened below - nor are there witnesses, police officers, documents, or expert scientific or medical testimony. All of this is
presented in a sterile, highly summarized 'record of the case.' The
actors are stick figures - the 'plaintiff,' the 'appellee,' and so on.
The concrete details

-

the drama of the trial

-

are missing. Little

confronts one to get excited, to engage the imagination, or to inflame one's sense of justice."
"I think we spoke about something similar once before. We
agreed it is only concreteness, not abstraction, that triggers conscience, that engages one's sense of moral outrage. 138 It's as though
medical students never studied using actual sick patients and only
reviewed hospital records of deaths, accidents, medical dosages, erroneous diagnoses, and so on."
"I think it was the fourth or fifth time we met," Rodrigo agreed.
"The Langdellian case method and Socratic teaching breed reductionlsm. For idealistic students, this approach is soul sapping, leading easily to a fatalistic acceptance of bad law. With less idealistic
students, it can breed crooks. Doctrinalism, much more so than its
critique, may be responsible for a pessimistic sense in students and
138. See Delgado, supra note 92, at 956 (commenting that "it is particularity and real
world detail that alone move us").
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young lawyers that the legal system is hopelessly confining and unfair and will always be that way."
Giannina added, "I see it all the time. My feminist classmates
understand that truth is situated, and that the struggle for truth is
about political negotiation - a power play, really - that seeks a
broader (or at least different) equalization of legal benefits and protections.13 9 We know that this is not at all nihilistic, as Carrington
charges. Rather, we see law as a sort of orchestral power play, fluid
and always ongoing. As such, lawyers must be ever vigilant, never
resting on their laurels or being content to say, 'Well, that's the doctrine.' Each victory signals another battle to come. Good doctrine
always slips away. As legal professionals, we have the duty constantly to be skeptical watchdogs of the oppressed and disadvan40
taged, to be catalysts of social change.'
"I wish I had more students like you," Rodrigo exclaimed. "Are
you sure you and your friends don't want to transfer?"
"I'm very happy where I am," Giannina declared. "But go on.
You said that particularity enhances empathy and moral instincts. I
think all of us agree with that. But you also hinted earlier that rigid
doctrinalism is especially hard on minorities and women. Do you
mean as learners, clients, or what?"
"Both," Rodrigo said. "You mentioned the Guinier study,
which found that women were apt to be more turned off than men
by the Socratic classroom - by verbal aggression, showmanship,
bluffing, sparring, and demand for performance.' 4' But I was really
thinking more of minorities and women as consumers."
"Hmm," I said. "I must remind you that the greatest civil rights
advocate of recent times, Justice Thurgood Marshall, had quite a
reputation as a stickler for civil procedure. 42 He displayed little
sympathy for civil rights advocates who hadn't bothered to learn
the rules of procedure and evidence or how to file a motion properly. 43 Don't civil rights attorneys need to know these things even
better than the average attorney because their papers and motions
139. Cf., eg., CATHARINE

MAcKINNON,

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 70-77 (1987) (discussing

women in law and the demand on them to be professionally masculine (the "man standard")
and personally feminine (the "lady standard")).
140. Se4 e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CoNN.L. REV. 363, 378 (1992) (arguing
that although law is unlikely to bring about racial fairness, we must nonetheless make the
effort); Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1 (exemplifying the search for new solutions).
141. See Guinier, supra note 95.
142. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Justice Marshallin the Medium of Civil Procedure: Portrait of a Master, 80 Gno. L.J. 2063 (1992).
143. See id. at 2079.
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will be scrutinized even more searchingly than those of the average
corporate lawyer or drafter of wills?"
"Lawyers must always know their craft," Rodrigo conceded.
"But we must also understand how the rules are stacked against us.
144
Consider the demand for neutral principles of civil rights law.
Neutrality - the idea that any rule operates the same way in different settings and for different litigants - very much advantages
those who currently enjoy a privileged position in society. This approach sees affirmative action as reverse discrimination: it disadvantages 'innocent' whites, who have done nothing wrong, for the
benefit of blacks, who - for all we know - may never have suf146
fered discrimination in their lives. 145 Our system is color-blind.
In one grotesque case, the Supreme Court held that women who
could not obtain a pregnancy benefit were not discriminated
against, because men could not obtain the benefit either. 147 The
law denied insurance benefits to all pregnant persons, male or
48
female."1
Giannina rolled her eyes. "Doctrinalism also disadvantages
women and minorities simply because of the great emphasis it
places on precedent. It justifies a current action or rule by virtue of
an earlier decision or rule. 49 Yet that earlier rule, laid down in an
age when women and people of color were less significant factors,
will likely disadvantage them. In this way, law's rules and narratives incorporate the ruling group's sense of things. Doctrinalism
passes that invisible advantage down to succeeding generations.' 50
Practical scholarship does the same - it ratifies and renders more
efficient the operation of class advantage."
144. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (urging that public law must rest on neutral principles, rather than on any sort
of favoritism for particular groups).
145. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 310-15
(1990) (showing how the "innocent white" concern underlies much of the resistance to racial
remediation); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black
Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 34-37 (1990) (detailing the obstructive power of the
narrative of "white innocence" in the search for reparational remedies for blacks).
146. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitutionis Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV,
1, 2-3 (1991) ("A color-blind interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby
maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other
Americans.").
147. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
148. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
149. See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813,
817-22 (1992).
150. See icL at 818, 823-24.
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"In both ways, doctrinalism replicates the status quo," Rodrigo
summarized. "In the classroom, it rewards a conventional sort of
quick-witted cleverness that relies on a few formulaic maneuvers
and axioms. It rewards posturing and self-assurance. In legal scholarship, it greases the wheels of industry. And in real life, it perpetuates past inequalities."
"The objective 'reasonably prudent man' standard, for example," Giannina hazarded. "Consider how it silently advantages men
and disadvantages women in tort law and a host of other areas. 151 I
was reading about a date-rape case on my campus the other day.
Two undergraduates had been talking and walking after a campus
party. Both had been drinking. Later they had sex, which the
woman said was coerced and nonconsensual. The man said she led
him on. The campus committee adopted his story, holding that a
reasonable male could interpret her lack of resistance, the way she
was dressed, and her willingness to kiss and cuddle as evidence of
her readiness to have sex. All of this she strenuously denied. In
many such cases, the man believes he is merely being commanding,
she coy. The woman, however, experiences the whole episode as
degrading and pressured. A legal standard predicated on what a
reasonable male date would see as consent simply buys into one
story - the man's. 52 And it does this under the guise of neutral
rules regarding what a reasonable, average person would understand about the situation."
"Formalism always narrows the range of considerations a legal
rule will take into account," I said. "That's its nature. And, in a
way, it has to. Otherwise, law would not work. The decisionmaker
potentially could take into account an infinitude of details. But I
gather you are not complaining about that, but rather the way doctrine submerges the interest of the weaker party?"
"I am," Rodrigo replied. "Nonstandard cases and people, such
as minorities, are excluded neatly under many legal rules. We use
nonformal rules when we want to do real justice, to corporations for
example. Consider long-arm jurisdiction and the multifaceted minimum-contacts test we employ there. 153 Or recall the large number
of defenses antidiscrimination law makes available to defendants:
business necessity, lack of intent, lack of causation, and so on."'1 54
151.
152.
153.
154.
1990).

See id. at 816, 821-22 (using example of a hypothetical date-rape case).
See iL at 819-20.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See NoRMAN VmnA, CONSTIUTIONAL CIVIL RIoHS 231-33, 238-39, 252 (2d ed.
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"Are you saying that predictability and the rule of law are not
goods?" I asked, determined to challenge Rodrigo as long as
possible.
"Not at all," he replied. "They are. Legal process and formalism, however, do not deliver them. They allow result-oriented decisions that favor the empowered party or his class. Only in that
sense is formalism predictable. The right to property, for example,
would protect everyone equally if everyone had approximately the
same amount of it. But, of course, they don't.155 So, the way things
are now, the right to hold property increases inequality, exacerbating the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Similarly, in a
society like ours, a neutral rule that says 'race doesn't count' tends
to advantage whites. Since they are members of the more advantaged race, the one that controls most of the assets, and the one
whose history, traditions, and narratives are reflected in the law,
customs, and form of government, the right to ignore one's race white, brown, or black - will tend to advantage them at the expense of all the others. All this while everyone loudly proclaims:
'Race is not important. We are all equal. We are all the same race:
American.' "156
"I agree," I said. "Formalism is not much of a friend to minorities. But what about the formalism that most conservatives love
most dearly: merit? Can there be any objection to using that principle - the most neutral of all - as a basis for distributing benefits
and goods, like places in a law school class? You and I are teachers,
Rodrigo. And perhaps Giannina, too, will be one some day. Rodrigo, you and I see differences among students every day. Some
answers in class are better than others. Some exams are better than
others. This you cannot deny."
"I think you and I discussed this before, Professor. 57 Merit
only exists relative to some set of conditions and objectives. Move
the hoop in a basketball game up or down six inches and you radically change the distribution of who has merit. The LSAT, for example, predicts first-year grades, but only because the curriculum is
the way it is. It predicts success as a lawyer much less well, because
155. On the gap in well-being between rich and poor and between whites and blacks in
the United States - one of the largest in the industrialized world - see Richard Delgado,
Derrick Bell and the Ideology of RacialReform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923,
931-32 & n.34 (1988) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE Nor SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987)). For other indications of social pathology, see Rodrigo's
First Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1370, 1376-77.
156. I am grateful to J.S.W. Park for this suggestion.
157. See Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 1732-40.
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lawyering requires many skills - empathy, communication, perseverance, cooperation - that neither the test nor the first-year curriculum emphasizes." 158
59 I
"Our friends Farber and Sherry have written about that,'
said, searching my memory. "I heard someone referring to their
article the other day. Oh, yes, it was my daughter's husband, who is
an assistant dean at a metropolitan campus downtown."
"Giannina and'I were talking about it, too. One of her professors held it up in class as a model of doctrinal clarity and scholarly
precision. She urged all of her students to read it, which most of
them went out and did. In the article, the two Minnesotans point
out that when crits like you and me trash conventional merit - do
you remember that news story about how coachable the SAT is? we neglect the impact of our actions on Jews and Asians. Those
two groups have climbed the ladder of conventional merit. So,
when the crits criticize conventional merit, they are being unwittingly anti-Semitic and anti-Asian. '160
"A perfect standoff," I said. "Conventional merit hurts most
minorities but helps Jews. Attacking conventional merit hurts Jews
but helps other minorities. How do you deal with that? It seems
like a good argument to me. They turn things around, just like you
do, Rodrigo."
"It's not a standoff at all," Rodrigo replied. "The SAT has a
thoroughly disreputable history of racism and Aryan supremacy.' 6 '
Critical thought does not. Nor do civil rights activists, crits, or other
progressive people have any comparable history of anti-Semitic or
anti-Asian sentiment. Quite the opposite: minority soldiers fought
to liberate the Jews in Germany and have opposed domestic antiSemitism throughout our history. The traditional civil rights alliance includes Jews and blacks marching side by side. Only extreme
formalism, ignoring history and context, could make Farber and
Sherry's two propositions look similar. A huge difference separates
attacking implicit racism in standard testing and attacking Jews and
Asians. It's like looking at the World Trade Center and a nomad's
158. See id.
at 1740-45 (pointing out that the distribution of merit is always relative to a
set of background considerations, such as economic and racial bias).
159. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit AntiSemitic?, 83 CAL. L. Rav. 853 (1995).
160. See id. at 856-57 (arguing that once standards of merit are discounted, any other
explanation of the success of Jews and Asians will be racist or anti-Semitic).
161. See Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle supra note 1, at 1741-45.
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tent through blinders and pronouncing them the same because both
are gray."
"What about more universalistic ethical and political principles,
such as promise keeping or ethical utilitarianism? Are these not
immune to your antiformalist attack?" Giannina asked. (I was glad
to see she sometimes joined me in pushing our young Wunderkind
to test his ideas.)
"They're certainly better than formalism's sterile neutralisms
and cich6 formulas, especially in the area of civil rights. The problem is that we have a mixed ethical system, one that gives some
weight to deontological principles - such as promise keeping but that also affords some scope for utility and the maximization of
social goods - such as pleasure and happiness."' 162
"I could use an example," I said.
"Act utilitarianism is said not to require consideration of beings
who lack any sense of their own futures. By the same token, the
young, who have long futures, generally prefer utilitarian ethics and
organization. Go ahead and adjust social security downward, they
say, otherwise the system will go broke and nothing will be left for
us. The elderly, by contrast, want promise keeping. Having lived
longer, they're apt to have more promises out, more things owed to
them, like social security. And so they say, 'Don't touch social security. It's a promise. We relied.'"
"I think I see where you are going," Giannina ventured. "Minorities are like adults - people whose cultural or collective history contains much mistreatment. As such, they will tend to
emphasize recompense for harm and similar Kantian-style principles. White liberals, by contrast, will treat affirmative action like an
ordinary social-engineering problem, with a forward-looking dimension, 163 'How many doctors and lawyers of color do we have?
Looks like we could use a few more. How about a program that
... ?' I was reading an article that observed that white liberals
almost always base affirmative action on utilitarian, forward-look162. That is to say, our ethical system seems to reflect, in nearly equal measure, Kantianism and Mils-Bentham-Rawls-style utilitarianism. We believe certain odious things - such
as enslavement or cruel punishments - are wrong per se, while others - such as curfews for
teenagers - are right or wrong only by virtue of their consequences (i.e., whether they deter
traffic accidents or excessive drinking on the part of the young more than they demean or
provoke resistance).
163. See Richard Delgado, The ImperialScholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literatur4 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561,569-71 (1984) (urging that society see affirmative action in
forward-looking terms); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 83-84 (1986) (noting that courts are beginning to take this approach).
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ing principles, while minorities do so on past, redress-oriented
grounds." 164
"So you are saying that even the very choice of ethical principle
to justify affirmative action is itself nonneutral."
"Exactly," Rodrigo and Giannina replied simultaneously, then
smiling at each other.
Giannina looked at Rodrigo, then summarized: "Ethical formalism, a cousin of the legal variety, obscures the power dimension
of the choice."
"Earlier you mentioned, Rodrigo, that formalism was bad not
only for minorities but for lawyers at large. You said something
about souls. I'd love to hear why. The older I get, the more interest I take in souls," I quipped.
"It's the last piece of the puzzle," Rodrigo agreed. "But," looking at his watch, "it's five minutes to ten. Don't you need to call?"
"Oh my goodness!" I exclaimed. "I'd better, or I'll be persona
non grata in my own household."
"That I doubt," said Giannina smiling as she pointed out the
corner of the restaurant where the pay phones were located.
After a brief conversation with my daughter ("Don't worry,
Dad, we decided to watch the late news. If we're not up, we'll leave
a key under the doormat"), I returned to the table, where my two
young friends were conversing animatedly.
"No problem. So long as I can keep my eyes open," I said.
"While you were away, Giannina was saying she hates psychological critiques, because she thinks they're unfair to one's adversary. I think it's curious for a playwright like Giannina not to be
interested in motivations. 'We just finished agreeing that it's okay to
dissect habits of mind so long as you do so in general terms, not as
applied to particular people."
"A sensible-sounding compromise," I said. "But is it a neutral
principle?"
Both my companions smiled, then Rodrigo continued as follows:

164. See Delgado, supra note 163.
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E. Rodrigo's Fifth Connection: Extreme Doctrinalism Promotes
Schizophrenia, Dishonesty, and Other Unfortunate Traits
of Mind on the Partof Its Devotees
"Formalism is a case of legal obsessionism, as Pierre Schlag calls
One devotes hours to small distinctions between this case and
that, looking for minute differences, when they count for very little
and when society and the legal system are in tatters. It also makes
you lie - to profess beliefs, for example, in the majesty of the rule
of law, in its internal consistency, and in the underlying coherence
of contradictory platitudes. It makes you recite things you know
are not true - that racism exists only when it is intended; that everyone knows the law; that all are rational-interest calculators and
cost avoiders; and that judges are capable of balancing incommensurable values. All this amounts to a vast sort of schizophrenia, in
which one knows things in ordinary life that one is forced to forget
when functioning as a lawyer. 166 This allows the ACLU, for example, to assert that vicious hate speech ought to go unregulated and
to maintain simultaneously that it is in the best interest of minorities that this be so.167 It allows lawyers solemnly to proclaim that
our system of criminal law is the best in the world, when over ninety
percent of defendants plead guilty and get no trial whatsoever.168
Doctrinal fascination, as Schiag calls it," Rodrigo said, reading from
a sheet he pulled out from his briefcase, "breeds a mentality prone
to 'coercion, wheedling, needling, harassment, and other rude and
crude practices of lawyers." 69 It also promotes grandiosity. Because no one else thinks that way, lawyers are superior to all the
rest - real professionals."
"Wouldn't teaching legal-ethics help?" I asked. "Carrington and
MacCrate both think so."
it.165

165. See Pierre Schlag, This Could Be Your Culture - Junk Speech in a Time of Decadence, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1801, 1820 (1996) (book review).
166. See id. at 1813-20.
167. See Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, PressureValves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of PaternalisticObjections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 871, 881
(1994) ("Many absolutists and defenders of the First Amendment urge that the First Amendment historically has been a great friend and ally of social reformers.").
168. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(c) (2d

ed. 1992) (citing former Chief Justice Burger's estimate that ninety percent of criminal defendants plead guilty). For statistical corroboration of this estimate, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS,

U.S. DEvr.

OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS -

1995, at 489,

498 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996) (indicating that 92% of state felony
convictions in 1992 and 91.9% of U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines cases in fiscal year
1995 were the result of guilty pleas).
169. Schlag, supra note 165, at 1816.
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"I doubt it," Rodrigo replied. "As we mentioned earlier, it's
170
concreteness, not abstraction, that triggers the moral impulse.
The usual course in professional responsibility merely takes the students through the rules. In a classic experiment, seminarians
stopped to help a man lying groaning on the sidewalk at a rate even
lower than passersby generally.171 Some just had heard the parable
of the Good Samaritan in class, but walked right on by. By the
same token, most students in professional responsibility classes
mainly internalize rules - don't do this or you'll be caught and this
is what will happen."
"Sounds dire. If not classes and teaching, then what?" I said.
Rodrigo replied, "Get the students out into the world. Give
them hands-on experience with real clients, with poverty, crime,
and neglect. The main use of language is to lie. As one of the most
word-based professions, law is apt to be the most debased. In a fine
book, Skover and Collins show how junk discourse edges out the
tempered, rational kind that is the model for the First Amendment.172 Like bad money driving out good, small-minded, angling,
wheedling habits of legal practice drive out the more civilized, temperate kind. Doctrinalism - too much 'law,' too many formulas is the main, dominant cause of our sad estate."
"Why do judges like Harry Edwards seem so enthralled with it,
then?" Giannina asked. "Is it merely professional self-interest, the
natural hope to find a law review article on point that will make it
easier to write that opinion?"
"Maybe so, in part," Rodrigo agreed. "But it may also be like
that of a schizophrenic who looks for others to share his or her
delusion. The desire may also contain an element of narcissism.
Judges are like construction workers. They want the physics department to write about them, and complain that the theoretical
physicists in the ivory tower never print anything they can use.
Some practitioners make the same complaint: What are you crits
doing for me, an overworked, harried legal services lawyer with a
huge caseload of poor clients? And, in a way, both are right: their
own work is vitally important. They are on the front lines. If the
rivets aren't put in right, the building will fall down. But the physi170. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
171. See Alfie Kohn, Between God and Good. Research Shows Believers Are No More
Likely to Love Their Neighbor Than Nonbelievers, S.F. CHRON. & EXAMINER, July 8, 1990
(This World), at 15 (summarizing various studies of helping behavior).
172. See RONALD K.L. CoLuNs & DAVID M. SKovER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE
(1996).
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cist may be researching an altogether new principle of building.
Judges are in some respects like the riveters, uninterested in what is
going on over in the physics department and wishing they would do
something for me."
"I'm not sure I'd go that far, Rodrigo," I interjected. "I've
known many fine judges who are interested in justice and willing to
innovate, if necessary, to find it. Maybe it's that legal scholarship
speaks to many different audiences, something our friend Harry
Edwards hasn't realized yet. Sometimes we aim our writing at the
courts; at other times for each other, our communities, or the legislature. Sometimes we aim to change the legal paradigm, not make
small refinements within it."
"Can I bring you folks something else?" our waiter asked. I
looked at my companions and shook my head. "Not for me."
"Could you bring us the bill?" Rodrigo asked.
"Let me take care of it," I offered. "I am on vacation, and you
two have helped bring me up to date. It's hard for an old guy in
retirement to keep up, especially spending ninety-nine percent of
my time outside the United States as I do without a comprehensive
law library, except the tiny one at the embassy."
"No, it's on us," Rodrigo said quietly, but firmly. "You are always an honored guest."
Resolving to let things lie for now but to make a lightning move
when the check arrived, I asked Rodrigo (partly in hopes of distracting him): "But Rodrigo, what use is it to know that doctrinalism in the law schools and as a judicial and scholarly philosophy
promotes all these ills we spoke of before? Doctrinalism is law on
the cheap. It's easy, lazy, and bureaucratic. It deflects you away
from things that would make you have to think hard, to take responsibility. By the same token, the Langdellian classroom is legal
education on the cheap. One professor holds sway over 100 students, dazzling them with imponderable questions and trick riddles.
The system has a big stake in formalism. How can we change that
without altering the material conditions of our work - that is to
say, virtually everything else?"
"Ouch," said Rodrigo, whether because I swiftly and sneakily
seized the check the waiter had deposited next to me - probably
as the most senior-looking diner at the table - or because of the
aptness of my question, I could not tell. "You seem to have got me,
Professor. A neo-Marxist in most things, I may nevertheless have
fallen prey to idealism, to thinking that if one simply names and
recognizes an evil, it will go away by itself. It obviously won't. The

February 1997]

Legal Formalism

1147

profit motive causes law firms to take on a certain structure, including hiring dozens of young associates they have no intention of
making partner, and assigning them to the library where they write
endless formalistic briefs, for which in turn they charge the client a
great deal of money, necessitating that the lawyer on the other side
write yet another massive case-cruncher, and so on forever. If the
modes of production -

the system of incentives -

stays the same,

tinkering with legal education, scholarship, or even new models of
clinical practice won't help. Law practice gets more and more arcane just as the student pool becomes more and more talented, with
LSATs, grades, and numbers of applicants soaring. Competition
becomes ever more fierce for seats in law schools. Students become
more cutthroat and less collegial than before, then go out into the
world where they become even more that way. And the law
schools cater to the large-firm mentality that now defines law practice. The cost of legal education skyrockets; students leave with
huge debts, which means they must practice in the large firms,
which pay the best salaries. The young associates lead lives of over1 73
work, stress, competition, and early burnout.
"Not a very appealing prospect," said Giannina wryly, "for
someone just starting out. But identifying an evil is a starting point.
And discovering its source the second step. If so, we've made progress. At least I've decided to throw away the Gilbert's and focus
on legal issues in the casebook that really matter."
"I'm betting your grades won't go down if you do," I said.
"I hope you're right," said Rodrigo. And with a laugh: "Our
family income is riding on it."
After a pause, I said: "I wonder if the profession's dissatisfactions and pathology will be sufficient to stimulate change."
"Women have been getting some firms to adopt measures like
maternity or family leave, part-time tracks, and child care allowances," Giannina pointed out.
"And those are all to the good," Rodrigo agreed. "But I think
the Professor is saying that the public's discontent may prove to be
a more vital stimulus for change, am I right?"
"I wouldn't be surprised," I said. "As my old friend Derrick
Bell has pointed out more than once, interest convergence is almost
everything. 174 If the public, including the big corporate clients, de173. See generally supra Part I.
174. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (pointing out that, at least in civil rights law, break-
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cide lawyers are an expensive, nettlesome luxury, prone to tie a
case up in knots, perform endless research, and postpone or interfere with an eventual resolution..."
"Nothing like a reality check for a person with a slight case of
schizophrenia," Rodrigo echoed.
"Minorities and the poor have long known the system was
stacked against them," Giannina observed. "Others may now find
out as well. As the economy increases the disparity between highand low-wage earners, the middle class continues to grow. Unless
these consumers fall below the absurdly low cutoff for publicly
funded legal aid, they will not qualify for any form of legal assistance. And the regular kind is simply too costly and intimidating.
The big law firms, eager to perpetuate profits, seek out big and
wealthy clients, usually corporate ones, leaving middle Americans
without affordable legal services."
"Something has to give," Rodrigo summarized. "Costly, nitpicking, formalistic lawyering, as we've said, is not the solution. It
is not craft, despite what our three authorities think. In fact, it's the
very thing that's causing all the trouble."
"Especially for women and minorities," Giannina added.
I signed the credit card bill the waiter had brought. "Would the
two of you like to see the baby?"
Giannina looked at Rodrigo. "We'd love to," she said. "How
about this weekend? My moot court reply brief is due Friday, so
I'll be feeling less pressured."
I told them I'd check with my daughter and son-in-law and jotted down the address for them on a napkin. "She's actually been
hoping to meet you. She's thinking of going to graduate school
when the baby gets a little older, and, would you believe, one of the
options she's thinking about is law school. I'm sure she'll have a lot
of questions."
We soon parted, Rodrigo and Giannina back to their apartment,
me to my daughter's home across town. As I rather sleepily rode
the taxi through the darkened streets, I reflected on what we had
said. The public was certainly disenchanted with law. Lawyers
were as well. But was legal formalism the cause, as Rodrigo had
argued? Or was it a type of refuge sought by a beleaguered profession - both cause and effect? Would outsider jurisprudence and
the new clinical theory, with their emphasis on narrative, creativity,
throughs are attributable more to the self-interest of dominant groups than to doctrine, altruism, or evolving notions of decency).
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and a sophisticated understanding of the client, provide a way out?
Rodrigo had argued once before that only outsider thought could
release a deadlocked West from decline and stasis. 175 Could legal
storytelling and the pungent insights of writers like Derrick Bell,
Mar Matsuda, Anthony Alfieri, Margaret Montoya, and, indeed,
Rodrigo, lead the way to a humanized law and better relations with
our various publics?
All this had a personal dimension as well, in ight of my own
daughter's plans. I looked forward to her meeting in a few days
with Rodrigo and Giannina - what fortune to have them as role
models! -,and wondered, idly, about the wisdom of my own selfexile from my native country, where so many intriguing currents
were playing themselves out - ideas being tested, new approaches
to scholarship surging forward almost daily.
"That's the street," I told the cabbie. "Turn here please."
The key was under the mat, just where my daughter had told me
it would be. I resolved to take a look at my visa and ask a few
questions at the consulate when I got home.

175. See Rodrigo's First Chronicle,supra note 1, at 1369-76.

